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WITH OUR FEET TO THE FIRE: REGIONAL AGREEMENTS
AS MECHANISMS OF CHANGING INTERNATIONAL LAW
TO INCLUDE PERSONS DISPLACED BY CLIMATE CHANGE
INTRODUCTION
As climate change becomes an increasingly dire problem, the global
community has equally and in tandem become more fraught in coming up with
a solution.1 With the Trump administration in the United States denying or
quietly withdrawing support for policies that would cut carbon emissions, it
seems the global community is sliding backwards in the arena of climate
change.2
This poses particular problems for individuals since there currently exists
little protection for persons fleeing their home countries due to sudden and
incremental effects of climate change.3 These effects include both the increase
in frequency of natural disasters such as drought and desertification and the
strengthening of the impact of the socio-economic deprivation that follows.4
Lack of food, water, and education caused by the lack or reduction of resources
as a result of climate change would not ordinarily sustain a refugee claim under
the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951
Convention”).5 António Guterres, the former United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, “has called for a new international protection
framework for people who have been forced to leave their own country and who
may not qualify for refugee status under international law, including people
displaced as a result of catastrophic environmental events.”6
This Comment will explore the potential avenues by which the international
community can address the increasingly pertinent problem of international
displacement as a result of climate change. First, this Comment will argue that
existing international law framework is inadequate to handle the growing issue

1
See generally Elaine Kamarck, The Challenging Politics of Climate Change, BROOKINGS (Sept. 23,
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-challenging-politics-of-climate-change (“Complexity is the
death knell of many modern public policy problems and solutions. And complexity is inherent in climate
change.”).
2
John Schwartz, Major Climate Change Rules the Trump Administration is Reversing, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/climate/climate-rule-trump-reversing.html.
3
Refugees, UNITED NATIONS – GLOBAL ISSUES, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/refugees.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Sarah O. Stapleton et al., REPORT ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION & DISPLACEMENT, OVERSEAS
DEV. INST. 27 (2017).
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of climate change displaced persons. Then, it will discuss the viability of using
pre-existing international refugee and migrant law to encompass climate
displaced persons.7
Although there have historically been expansions of the definition of both
“refugee” and “migrant” in international law, there are still substantial gaps left
by trying to stretch the definition of “refugee” to include climate change
displaced persons.8 As a result, this Comment suggests a different international
framework is required to deal with the humanitarian crisis—one unique to
climate change displaced persons (and indeed, has been called upon by various
figures of international prominence).9
I.

CLIMATE CHANGE: WE DIDN’T START THE FIRE—OR DID WE?

It is a truth nearly universally acknowledged that our planet’s climate has
been changing to devastating effect.10 2019 was the second-hottest year on
record, resulting in, inter alia, the severe heatwaves that hit various parts of the
globe.11 In June 2019, northern Europe experienced a record-setting heatwave
that led France and Germany to shut down nuclear reactors.12 The hot air then
migrated to Greenland, where temperatures rose to as much as fifteen degrees
Fahrenheit above normal, causing the surface of Greenland’s ice sheet to melt at
7
There has been no international consensus as to what persons displaced by climate change should be
called, but in the effort to be succinct, this Comment will use the phrase “climate change displaced persons”
while recognizing there is still space in the academic and legal literature for a more appropriate title. See Climate
Change and Displacement, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, https://www.unhcr.org/enus/news/stories/2019/10/5da5e18c4/climate-change-and-displacement.html (“Technically speaking, therefore, the term
‘climate refugee’ is something of a misnomer, as it has no basis in international law and does not accurately
reflect the complex ways in which climate and human mobility interact.”). See generally Jayla Lundstrom,
Climate Change is Altering Migration Patterns Regionally and Globally, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 3,
2019),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2019/12/03/
478014/climate-change-altering-migration-patterns-regionally-globally.
8
See Jackie Swift, Migration, Forced by Climate Change, CORNELL RSCH., https://research.cornell.edu/
news-features/migration-forced-climate-change.
9
See, e.g., John Podesta, The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees, BROOKINGS (July 25, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees.
10
See Climate Change and Public Health Policy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/policy.htm.
11
Drew Kann, It’s Official: 2019 was the Second-Hottest Year on Record, CNN (Jan. 8, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/08/world/2019-temperatures-second-hottest-year-on-record-climate-change/
index.html.
12
Henry Fountain, Europe’s Heat Wave, Fueled by Climate Change, Moves to Greenland, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/climate/european-heatwave-climate-change.html; Henry
Fountain, Climate Change is Accelerating, Bringing World ‘Dangerously Close’ to Irreversible Change, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/04/climate/climate-change-acceleration.html [hereinafter
Fountain, Climate Change is Accelerating].
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near-record levels.13 In one week in late July, fifty-seven people in Japan died
due to heat-related medical issues and thousands more were hospitalized,
resulting in the second highest number of hospitalizations due to high
temperatures on record in Japan.14 A particularly devastating result of the series
of heatwaves was the 1.5 million-acre fire that ignited across Australia in late
2019.15 The fire resulted in the devastating loss of property and animal and
human life.16
Certainly, some part of the heatwave that sparked the wildfires in Australia
is due to periodic occurrences.17 For example, short-term weather patterns, like
the Indian Ocean Dipole, pushed away moisture from Australia in the spring
preceding the wildfires.18 This, therefore, made the country drier in spring and
thus likely contributed at least somewhat to the wildfires in the summer.19
Additionally, high temperatures and dry weather are generally typical symptoms
of summer.20 Australian experts note that the dry season has been getting longer
and more frequent, which is a phenomenon that has been linked to climate
change.21
As of January 2020, the fires have been somewhat contained with the arrival
of rains.22 However, the ramifications and future effects of the blaze on
Australia’s unique ecosystems and human health remain to be seen.23
Australia is, unfortunately, not the only country to have suffered enormous
loss due to natural disasters. Since 2008, catastrophic weather disasters have

13

Fountain, Climate Change is Accelerating, supra note 12.
57 Dead and 18,000 Taken to Hospitals in One Week Amid Japan Heat Wave, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 6,
2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/08/06/national/57-dead-18000-taken-hospitals-one-weekamid-japan-heat-wave/#.Xegi8OhKg2w.
15
Brian Resnick et al., 8 Things Everyone Should Know about Australia’s Wildfire Disaster, VOX (Jan.
10, 2020), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2020/1/8/21055228/australia-fires-map-animals-koalaswildlife-smoke-donate.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See generally Pablo Uchoa, et al., Indian Ocean Dipole: What is It and Why is It Linked to Floods and
Bushfires?, BBC (Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-50602971.
19
Resnick et al., supra note 15.
20
Id.
21
Id.; State of the Climate 2018, Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology (2018) (“There has been
a long-term increase in extreme fire weather, and in the length of the fire season, across large parts of
Australia.”).
22
Joshua Berlinger & Hilary Whiteman, Rain Pelts Fire-Ravaged Australian States, Bringing New Risks
– and Some Relief, CNN (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/16/australia/australia-weather-intlhnk/index.html.
23
Resnick et al., supra note 15.
14
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displaced about twenty-four million people have been displaced by each year.24
In 2016, the ten largest displacement events were climate-related.25 However,
natural disasters are not the only potential climate-related threats that cause
displacement, both internally and externally. In 2018, the World Bank released
a report that projected 143 million people in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia,
and Latin America could be forced to move within their own countries to escape
slow-onset impacts of climate change.26
While most displaced people tend to stay within their state borders, there are
various regions whose citizens may soon be forced to seek relocation solutions
abroad. Island communities situated in the Caribbean, Pacific, and Atlantic
Oceans are at the frontline of the climate change crisis.27 As oceans warm and
sea-levels rise, such nations may even become uninhabitable.28 Claire Anterea,
a 41-year-old climate activist on the Pacific island nation of Kiribati, has noticed
the change even within her own lifetime.29 “My family’s home floods
throughout the year,” she stated in an email to NPR.30 “I see the sea getting
higher as the coastal areas are eaten away.”31 Elsewhere in the South Pacific,
coastal erosion has stripped so much away that countries have begun
contemplating regional migration plans.32 The Solomon Islands’ environment
minister, Melchoir Mataki, has called such plans a last resort, but also
acknowledges that “for some parts of [the Solomon Islands], it is the only
reasonable and sustainable option.”33
While Pacific Island nations may face the brunt of the effects wrought by
climate change, coastal areas in other countries will be affected.34 One only
needs to look at a projected future map of the U.S. coastline; there are cities in

24
Tim McDonnell, The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To, NPR: GOATS & SODA (June 20,
2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/the-refugees-that-the-world-barelypays-attention-to.
25
Stapleton et al., supra note 6, at 10.
26
McDonnell, supra note 24.
27
Dominic Davis, Island Nations on Climate Crisis Frontline ‘Not Sitting Idly By’, U.N. NEWS (Sept. 26,
2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/09/1047652.
28
Ashley Westerman, ‘We Need Support’: Pacific Islands Seek Help and Unity to Fight Climate Change,
NPR (Oct. 5, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/05/764570478/we-need-support-pacific-islands-seek-helpand-unity-to-fight-climate-change.
29
Id.
30
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
31
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
32
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
33
Id.
34
Davis, supra note 27.
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states like Florida and Louisiana that will no longer exist as a result of
encroaching sea levels.35
With the increasing threat to these countries from climate change and the
corresponding lack of alternative methods to combat it, the global community
must consider how to best act in response to this ever-growing problem. The
international community at large must shoulder some responsibility for the
results of climate change. Small Pacific Island nations—while saddled with the
most obvious effects of climate change—are in actuality the ones who have
contributed least to the problem.36 Large economic powers like the United States
and China have enormous carbon footprints.37 In comparison, Pacific Island
nations like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands produce considerably less
greenhouse gas emissions.38 It seems unfair for the burden of providing a
solution to so lopsidedly fall on the shoulders of those countries who contribute
the least to the problem.
II. EXISTING SPACES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW DEFINITIONS
A. Does “Refugee” Apply?
The temptation to classify persons displaced by climate change and disasters
as refugees is understandable. For those who are forced to cross international
borders by circumstances outside their control, the crux of international legal
protection has primarily been concentrated in refugees and, to a lesser extent,
migrants.39 The protections offered to persons who fall into the definition of
refugee under the 1951 Convention are robust and well-documented.40
In 2013, the Teitiota family, citizens of Kiribati, became the first to grapple
with the question of whether individuals who have been displaced by climate
change can avail themselves of the procedures and laws in place to help

35
See generally Sea Level Rise Viewer, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://coast.noaa.
gov/slr/#/layer/slr/0/628666.2119643372/1211411.854698917/1/satellite/none/0.8/2050/interHigh/midAccretio
n.
36
Davis, supra note 27.
37
Umair Irfan, Why the U.S. Bears the Most Responsibility for Climate Change, in One Chart, VOX (Dec.
4, 2019), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/4/24/18512804/climate-change-united-stateschina-emissions.
38
Davis, supra note 27.
39
See Asylum and Migration, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, https://www.unhcr.org/
en-us/asylum-and-migration.html.
40
See id.; ‘Refugees’ and ‘Migrants’ – Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMM’R FOR REFUGEES: REFWORLD (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.refworld.org/docid/56e81c0d4.html.
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refugees.41 The family moved to New Zealand and applied for refugee status
there.42 Their claim for asylum explicitly stated they were entitled to be
recognized as refugees because of the changes to the environment of Kiribati as
a result of the rising sea levels attributable to climate change.43
Citizens of Pacific island nations are perhaps the most vulnerable to the
rising sea levels associated with climate change and the irreversible damage to
their sovereignty climate change poses.44 As John Podesta, the founder and
director of the Center for American Progress, notes, “[i]slands in the Federated
States of Micronesia have drastically reduced in size, washed down to an
uninhabitable state, had their fresh water contaminated by the inflow of
seawater, and disappeared in the past decade.”45 This poses a crisis for national
sovereignty and individuals, who are forced to relocate as their country literally
disappears from underneath their feet.46 Although the Teitiota family’s case was
ultimately dismissed by the High Court of New Zealand, the final judgment
declined to completely foreclose the possibility that climate change or other
kinds of environmental degradation could lead to protected status as refugees
under international law.47
1. International Definition of “Refugee”
After World War II, almost eleven million people in Europe had been
displaced.48 In response, the states of the United Nations banded together to
establish a system to “protect civilians who had been forced from their home
countries by political violence.”49 The 1951 Convention, ratified by 145 parties,
became the key document that formed the basis of the legal definitions and
protections offered to refugees forced out of their country of origin.50 The core
principle of the Convention remains the principle of non-refoulement, which
41
See Tim McDonald, The Man Who Would Be the First Climate Change Refugee, BBC (Nov. 5, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34674374.
42
New Zealand: ‘Climate Change Refugee’ Case Overview, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.
gov/law/help/climate-change-refugee/new-zealand.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2020).
43
Id.; Podesta, supra note 9.
44
Podesta, supra note 9.
45
Id.
46
See generally Sarah M. Munoz, What Happens When a Country Drowns?, CONVERSATION (July 1,
2019), https://theconversation.com/what-happens-when-a-country-drowns-118659.
47
New Zealand: ‘Climate Change Refugee’ Case Overview, supra note 42.
48
Shauna Labman, Looking Back, Moving Forward: The History and Future of Refugee Protection, 10
CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 9 (2010).
49
Podesta, supra note 9.
50
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES: THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION, https://www.
unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html.
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asserts that “refugees should not be returned to a country where they face serious
threats to their life or freedom.”51 The principle of non-refoulement has since
become customary international law, which is binding on all states, regardless if
they are party to the 1951 Convention.52 Since the signing, the 1951 Convention
has been expanded under the 1967 Protocol, which removes geographical and
time limitations that were in place as a result of the initial convention being an
answer to refugees in Europe post-World War II.53
The 1951 Convention provides a singular definition for “refugee.”54 A
refugee is “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of
origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion.”55 This definition has been enshrined in various different countries’
domestic immigration and refugee laws, which further bolsters the protections
and rights assured to refugees seeking asylum internationally.56 Even countries
that were not initial signatories of the 1951 Convention have adopted a definition
of “refugee” similar to the one laid out in the 1951 Convention.57
Both international and domestic law have recognized five separate elements
that must be met for a person to qualify as a refugee:
 Well-founded fear of persecution
 For reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group, or political opinion[]
 is outside the country of his nationality
 is unable or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country

51

Id.
Id.; The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol, United Nations
High Commissioner For Refugees, Sept. 2011, 5.
53
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its 1967 Protocol, United Nations High
Commissioner For Refugees, Sept. 2011, 4.
54
Id. at 3.
55
Id.
56
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES: ASYLUM IN THE U.K., https://www.unhcr.org/uk/
asylum-in-the-uk.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2019); In re A--- R--- C--- G--- et al., 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390
(B.I.A. Aug. 26, 2014); Claim Refugee Status From Inside Canada: Who Can Apply—Eligibility, https://www.
canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/refugees/claim-protection-inside-canada/eligibility.
html (last visited May 25, 2020).
57
American Courts and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: A Need for Harmony in the Face of
a Refugee Crisis, 131 HARVARD L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2018).
52
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 not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former
habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it.58
Although there has not been a successful claim brought merely based on
climate change, it is possible to consider a hypothetical situation where climate
change can drive factors that lead to a successful asylum claim, such as a
situation where climate change leads to an extended drought. The resulting crop
destruction leads to famine as a result of lack of food. This competition for
resources then creates factions drawn along lines of identity, and the government
does not intervene. In such a case, it is likely that the individual would be able
to seek asylum in another country as a refugee under the definition in the 1951
Convention.
In the foregoing hypothetical, these individuals are not recognized as
refugees because they were displaced due to a natural disaster likely attributable
to climate change. Rather, in this case, climate change merely exacerbated the
issue and created the circumstance from which the individual needed to seek
refuge. This kind of scenario, although effective under the current international
refugee doctrine, does not point to the real problem. That is, as climate change
occurs, and its effects become permanent, how is the global community
equipped to understand and cope with the ever-growing likelihood that a
sizeable amount of people will need to migrate elsewhere. Since not all climate
change displaced persons who cross international borders may fulfill all five
elements in the definition of refugee, many are not able to avail themselves of
international protection.59
The most difficult situation under which many climate change displaced
persons find themselves if they try to fit into the definition of “refugee” is
persecution. Persecution has been poorly defined in the realm of international
law.60 Indeed, there is no universally accepted definition of the word.61
However, in 1992, the UNHCR issued a handbook to provide guidance to
58
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEE, PROTECTION TRAINING MANUAL FOR
EUROPEAN BORDER AND ENTRY OFFICIALS, SESSION 3 MANUAL: WHO IS A REFUGEE? 3
https://www.unhcr.org/4d944c319.html [hereinafter PROTECTION TRAINING MANUAL].
59
See About Us, NANSEN INITIATIVE, https://www.nanseninitiative.org/secretariat/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2020) (“[A] serious legal gap exists with regard to cross-border movements in the context of disasters and the
effects of climate change.”).
60
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’N. FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES para. 51, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992) [hereinafter HANDBOOK ON
PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA]
61
Id.
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governments “relating to procedures and criteria for determining refugee
status.”62 The handbook discusses the definition and interpretation of terms
found in the 1951 Convention, including the five various factors that determine
refugee status.63 It notes that the language of the 1951 Convention suggests “a
threat to life or freedom on account of race, religion, nationality, political
opinion or membership of a particular social group” or “other serious violations
of human rights” would constitute persecution.64
The handbook also keeps the door open on other “prejudicial actions or
threats” that would amount to persecution, determined by an evaluation of the
person’s opinions or feelings regarding their fear of persecution.65 This
necessarily vague definition of persecution allows for countries to implement
their own definitions and maintain “some discretion to steer asylum policies in
a rapidly changing world.”66
However, even with broad and ambiguous interpretations of the definition
of “persecution,” it seems unlikely that most climate change displaced persons
would be able to meet this criterium for several reasons. First, the handbook
deliberately excludes natural disasters or famine as reasons relevant to a wellfounded fear of persecution, absent any other reason related to the person being
in one of the protected groups delineated by the wording of the Convention.67
Although the handbook is not law, and therefore does not necessarily enshrine
the exclusion of natural disasters or famine in international law, it is certainly
persuasive in courts’ interpretation of the definition of refugee.68
Second, even if the handbook had not explicitly excluded natural disasters
or famine from the consideration of “persecution,” domestic jurisdictions such
as Canada and New Zealand have since defined “persecution” to include
“situations where the state is not in strictness an accomplice to the persecution

62

Id. at IV.
Id. at para. 31–32, 34.
64
PROTECTION TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 58.
65
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA, supra note 60, at para. 52.
66
Francesco Maiani, The Concept of “Persecution” in Refugee Law: Indeterminacy, Context-sensitivity,
and the Quest for a Principled Approach, LES DOSSIERS DU GRIHL, LES DOSSIERS DE JEAN-PIERRE CAVAILLÉ,
DE LA PERSECUTION (Feb. 28, 2010), https://journals.openedition.org/dossiersgrihl/3896.
67
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA, supra note 60, at para. 39 (“The expression ‘owing
to well-founded fear of being persecuted’ – for the reasons stated – by indicating a specific motive automatically
makes all other reasons for escape irrelevant to the definition. It rules out such persons as victims of famine or
natural disaster, unless they also have well-founded fear of persecution for [race, religion, nationality, political
opinion or membership of a particular social group].”).
68
Id. at VII.
63
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but is simply unable to protect its citizens[,]”69 or more simply, “persecution =
serious harm + failure of state protection.”70 Because climate change displaced
persons could theoretically still rely on their national governments for
protection, they do not meet one of the fundamental elements to establish
persecution which, in turn, is one of the five elements in the international law
definition of “refugee.”71
This element is where the Teitiota family’s claim failed. New Zealand’s
Supreme Court held because there was no indication the Kiribati government
was failing to take steps to protect its citizens from the effects of environmental
degradation to the extent that it could, the Teitiota family could not avail
themselves of the protections allowed to refugees.72 Thus, although persons
displaced by climate change might seek aid from the current international
refugee framework, it seems unlikely they can avail themselves of those
protections.
2. Regional Expansions of the Definition of “Refugee”
Attempting to fit climate change displaced persons into the framework of the
1951 Convention does not fully appreciate the breadth and complexity of the
situations faced by those displaced by climate change.73 Although no evidence
exists that the government failed to take action to protect the Teitiota family and
its other citizens from environmental degradation as a result of climate change,
there is a limit to what the Kiribati government can do in the face of rising sea
levels.74
However, the 1951 Convention’s definition of “refugee” sets merely a
floor.75 As discussed further in this Section, regional conventions can address
69

Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689.
Refugee Appeal No. 74665/03, at para. 53 (July 7, 2004) (N.Z.).
71
The Concept of “Climate Refugee”: Towards a Possible Definition, EUR. PARL. DOC. (PE 621.893) 5
(2019); see also Bhanu Sridharan, “Not Doing Anything is No Longer Acceptable”: A Conversation with Alice
Thomas, Climate Refugee Expert, PACIFIC STANDARD (Sept. 4, 2018) https://psmag.com/environment/not-doinganything-is-no-longer-acceptable-a-conversation-with-alice-thomas-climate-refugee-expert (“[M]ost climate-affected
migrants will not be leaving their countries.”).
72
New Zealand:’Climate Change Refugee’ Case Overview, supra note 42.
73
See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES: CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT, https://
www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/stories/2019/10/5da5e18c4/climate-change-and-displacement.html.
74
For example, regional migration is an option for the Solomon Islands, albeit a last resort. See
Westerman, supra note 28.
75
See American Courts and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: A Need For Harmony in the Face
of a Refugee Crisis, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2018) (“The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Convention) and its subsequent amendment, the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Protocol)—instruments that are fairly short and drafted broadly, with many important clauses open for
70
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and expand upon the baseline provided by the 1951 Convention. The two
following examples, the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (“OAU
Convention”) and the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (“Cartagena
Declaration”), are illustrative of how regional treaties can be successful in
expanding international legal standards to fit region-specific issues while also
operating as a complement to international law.76
a. The OAU Convention
The OAU Convention sprung out of the regional need to broaden the
definition of “refugee” to better suit the issues that African countries were facing
at the time—that is, those problems of “violent struggle for self-determination
and national development.”77 Article I of the OAU Convention categorized
refugees within the region using the same framework as the 1951 Convention,
but added an additional circumstance where a person might be considered a
refugee.78 Article I of the OAU Convention reads:
The term “refugee” shall also apply to every person who, owing to
external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his
country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of
habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his
country of origin or nationality.79

This definition of refugee expanded the legal definition—and therefore, legal
protection—to those “forced to leave their countries owing to aggression by
another State and/or as a result of an invasion.”80 Crucially, however, people
seeking asylum under the OAU Convention’s definition of refugee did not need
to “justify their fear of persecution.”81
This was a radical change from the 1951 Convention’s definition—one
which has stumbled into roadblocks in countries like the United States and the
United Kingdom, where many asylum appeals are denied due to a lack of
interpretation—govern this regime.”).
76
See generally OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept.
10, 1969 [hereinafter OAU Convention]; Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Nov. 22, 1984 [hereinafter
Cartagena Declaration].
77
Eduardo Arboleda, Refugee Definition in Africa and Latin America: The Lesson of Pragmatism, 3 INT’L
J. REFUGEE L. 185, 186 (1991).
78
Id. at 188–89.
79
Id. at 189.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 194.
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showing of adequate persecution as connected to the asylum-seeker’s particular
characteristic.82 Additionally, it has become law in the region, created by
representatives from several states in the region in response to the regionspecific need.83 Several countries—such as Angola, Ghana, South Africa, and
Uganda—have used the expanded definition to inform their own domestic
legislation.84 Thus, the OAU Convention illustrates the potential power and
sensitivity the response by the region’s nation-states can have on international
law.
b. The Cartagena Declaration
Like the states who were party to the OAU Convention, states in Central
America required an expansion from the international standard of “refugee” to
respond to region-specific problems. Specifically, outbreaks of violence in the
1980s in Central America “forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their
homes . . . .”85 Like the OAU Convention, the Cartagena Declaration expanded
the definition of “refugee” beyond the 1951 Convention to include those fleeing
from circumstances or events that disturbed the public order.86 In doing so, the
Cartagena Declaration also explicitly referenced the fact the expanded definition
of “refugee” was in response to “massive flows of refugees in the Central
American area . . . .”87
As a result, the Cartagena Declaration approached the definition of refugee
with a distinctly Central American focus, embracing the “Central American
reality.”88 The drafters of the Cartagena Declaration recognized a need to
develop a more expansive definition of “refugee,” and the urgency of the
situation “superseded the tendency to remain within the formal bounds of legal
discourse.”89 This expanded definition was later adopted into Brazil’s national
82

See, e.g., In re A--- R--- C--- G--- et al., 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389–90, 393–94 (B.I.A. Aug. 26,

2014).
83

Arboleda supra note 77, at 192–93.
Tsion T. Abebe et al., After 50 Years, Africa’s Refugee Policy Still Leads, INST. FOR SEC. STUD.
(June 20, 2019), https://issafrica.org/iss-today/after-50-years-africas-refugee-policy-still-leads.
85
Arboleda, supra note 77, at 200.
86
Arboleda, supra note 77, at 204–05; Cartagena Declaration, supra note 76, art. III, para. 3 (“[T]he
definition or concept of [] refugee[s] [is] . . . persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or
freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation
of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”).
87
Cartagena Declaration, supra note 76.
88
Arboleda, supra note 77, at 204.
89
Arboleda, supra note 77 at 205; Cartagena Declaration, supra note 76, art. 1 (“Recognizing that the
refugee situation in Central America has evolved in recent years to the point at which it deserves special
attention.”).
84
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legislation in 1997.90 In 2019, the Brazilian government utilized the definition
to approve 174 requests for refugee status by citizens of Venezuela.91
3. Applicability to Climate Change Displaced Persons
However, the question is whether such regional expansions of the definition
of “refugee” can extend so far as to encompass climate change displaced
persons. Under the definitions provided by both the OAU Convention and the
Cartagena Declaration, it could be possible that “events seriously disturbing the
public order” might extend to large events that could be attributable to climate
change.92 Certainly a natural disaster might be considered an event disturbing
the public order.
Consider, as in the hypothetical discussed above, a drought that leads to
famine. Whereas a claim based on the 1951 Convention definition of refugee
would require that nexus between the famine and violence on account of one of
the five protected characteristics, under the OAU Convention, the individual
would not have to prove that they had been persecuted. Accordingly, climate
change displaced persons may be able to seek asylum on the basis of their
refugee status under these wider definitions.
However, for those climate change displaced persons outside the jurisdiction
of these two conventions, there is still little recourse. It seems unlikely that other
regions will adopt similarly expansive definitions of “refugee.” Although the
OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration were both successful in
expanding the definition, the process required extensive efforts on the part of the
national governments of states party to the agreements to both participate in the
creation of and later adopt the principles in the agreements.93 Additionally, the
mere fact that such a definition exists in the region does not necessarily mean
that each individual state chooses to immediately adopt such an expansive
definition; as discussed above, Brazil only adopted the broader definition of the
Cartagena Declaration in 1997.94

90
ACNUR Parabeniza Brasil por Reconhecer Condição de Refugiado de Venezuelanos com base na
Declaração de Cartagena, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES – BRASIL (July 29, 2019),
https://www.acnur.org/portugues/2019/07/29/acnur-parabeniza-brasil-por-reconhecer-condicao-de-refugiadode-venezuelanos-com-base-na-declaracao-de-cartagena/ (last visited May 31, 2020).
91
Id.
92
Phillip D. Warren, Forced Migration After Paris COP21: Evaluating The “Climate Change
Displacement Coordination Facility”, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2103, 2123 (2016) (emphasis omitted).
93
See generally Arboleda, supra note 77.
94
ACNUR Parabeniza Brasil por Reconhecer Condição de Refugiado de Venezuelanos com base na
Declaração de Cartagena, supra note 90.
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Given the denial of the Teitiota family’s claim in New Zealand, and the
Supreme Court of New Zealand’s explicit reference to the definition found in
the 1951 Convention, it seems unlikely that, at least in the Pacific Ocean region,
the definition of “refugee” will be handily expanded.95 Despite the Supreme
Court of New Zealand’s qualification that its decision in the Teitiota case does
not foreclose environmental degradation as a possible pathway to protection
under international refugee guidelines, the New Zealand High Court—the
appeals court—heard and subsequently denied applications for asylum from
citizens of other Pacific Island nations who claimed fear of harm from
environmental problems attributable to climate change.96 It was more common
practice to deny various other suits that claimed asylum based on environmental
changes and degradation.97
Therefore, while some regional definitions of “refugee” may be broad
enough to cover climate displaced persons, attempting to fit climate change
displaced persons under that large umbrella would lead to uneven results, since
other regions of the world likely do not feel the need to consider expanding the
definition of “refugee.”
B. Does “Migrant” Apply?
Unlike “refugee,” the term “migrant” is not defined in international law.98
Because it has not been defined, different stakeholders have used it differently.99
The term has traditionally been used to refer to people who move by choice,
typically across international boundaries.100 However, the UNHCR has
recognized that the term has increasingly been used to refer to any person
moving at any time, for any reason.101 Individual countries, such as the United
States, have been equally as broad in defining “migrant” domestically.102
Therefore, it is likely climate change displaced persons already fall under
the category of “migrant.” There is no doubt that climate change displaced
persons can be considered migrants under the more recent, more general
95

New Zealand: ‘Climate Change Refugee’ Case Overview, supra note 42.
Id.
97
Id.
98
Migrant Definition, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES—EMERGENCY HANDBOOK,
https://emergency.unhcr.org/entry/44937/migrant-definition (last visited Feb. 10, 2020).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Definition of Terms, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/datastandards-and-definitions/definition-terms (last visited Feb. 10, 2020) (“Migrant– A person who leaves his/her
country of origin to seek residence in another country.”).
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definition of the term. However, this offers little benefit to climate change
displaced persons. There is no internationally recognized legal definition for
“migrant.”103 It is for this reason the UNHCR cautions against conflating
“migrant” and “refugee,” since refugees are given special legal status
internationally as a result of the 1951 Convention.104 Conversely, “migrant” was
a catch-all term.105 Whereas refugees could gain protection from asylum states,
migrants had no such well-defined recourse.106
Thus, although climate change displaced persons fall under the category of
“migrant,” there were few applicable frameworks under international law that
could help climate change displaced persons prior to the approval of the Global
Compact on Refugees and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular
Migration.107
III. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS PROBLEMS POSED BY CLIMATE
CHANGE DISPLACED PERSONS
Beginning in 2016, there seemed to be a movement of the international
community to attempt to fill in the gaps with the creation of the Global Compacts
on Refugee and Migrants.108 However, even with this concerted and laudable
effort by the international community, climate change displaced persons still
find themselves in legal limbo.
A. Global Compact on Refugees
In 2016, it appeared that the global community was galvanized to address
the problem of global and internal migration.109 On September 19, 2016, the
member-states of the United Nations converged in New York City to “address
the question of large movements of refugees and migrants . . . .”110 Subsequently,
103
See Who is a Migrant?, UNITED NATIONS IOM, https://www.iom.int/who-is-a-migrant (last visited Feb.
10, 2020).
104
Migrant Definition, supra note 98.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Global Compact for Migration, UNITED NATIONS IOM, https://www.iom.int/global-compactmigration (last visited Feb. 10, 2020).
108
See Global Compact on Refugees, Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, U.N. Doc. A/73/12
(Part II) (2018) [hereinafter Refugee Compact]; G.A. Res. 73/195, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and
Regular Migration (2018) [hereinafter Migration Compact].
109
G.A. Res. 71/1, New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, at 1 (Sept. 19, 2016) [hereinafter
New York Declaration].
110
Id.; Cathryn Costello, Refugees and (Other) Migrants: Will the Global Compacts Ensure Safe Flight
and Onward Mobility for Refugees?, 30 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 643, 643 (2018).
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the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (“New York Declaration”)
was unanimously adopted.111 The New York Declaration purported to be an
ambitious commitment to the issue of refugees and migrants, especially
emphasizing the need for global responsibility-sharing and “the importance of a
humanitarian approach to both migrants and refugees.”112
Crucially, the New York Declaration laid out the Comprehensive Refugee
Response Framework (CRRF), which boldly detailed the guidelines for refugee
reception, admission, and support, in addition to support for the host
countries.113 The CRRF was then “rolled out in diverse refugee situations across
more than a dozen countries[,]” and the results of the implementation of the
CRRF were compiled and analyzed by the UNHCR.114
The Global Compact on Refugees (“Refugee Compact”) is the doctrinal
successor to the CRRF.115 In fact, much of the Refugee Compact is built off the
various consultations and analyses performed by the UNHCR following the
implementation of the CRRF in various member-states.116 Affirmed on
December 17, 2018, the Refugee Compact proffered to be an international
framework for “more predictable and equitable responsibility-sharing” to
achieve a solution to the unprecedented number of migrants and refugees forced
to leave their countries of origin due to circumstances outside their control.117
The four key objectives of the Refugee Compact are listed on the UNHCR’s
site: (1) “[e]ase the pressures on host countries”; (2) “[e]nhance refugee selfreliance”; (3) “[e]xpand access to third-country solutions”; and (4) “[s]upport
conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.”118 The Refugee
Compact, as listed in its guiding principles, “represents the political will and
ambition of the international community as a whole for strengthened

111

New York Declaration, supra note 109, at 1; Costello, supra note 110, at 643.
New York Declaration, supra note 109, at 2–3; see also New York Declaration, UNITED NATIONS:
REFUGEES & MIGRANTS, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration; Costello, supra note 110.
113
G.A. Res. 71/1, annex, Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (Sept. 19, 2016) [hereinafter
CRRF].
114
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES,
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
See generally United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Two Year Progress Assessment of the CRRF
Approach September 2016 – September 2018: Evaluation Report, ES/2018/07 (Dec. 31, 2018).
115
Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, supra note 114.
116
Refugee Compact, supra note 108.
117
The Global Compact on Refugees, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, https://www.unhcr.
org/en-us/the-global-compact-on-refugees.html.
118
Id.
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cooperation and solidarity with refugees and affected host countries.”119
However, the Refugee Compact does little to specifically recognize issues and
problems facing climate change displaced persons who are forced to migrate out
of their country of origin.120 Without specific recognition, climate change
displaced persons continue to face several obstacles.121
First, the New York Declaration fails to push the envelope on expanding
refugees to potentially cover climate change displaced persons.122 Rather, it
reaffirms the definition of “refugee” as defined by the 1951 Convention, while
“merely noting wider regional refugee definitions.”123 Because the definition of
“refugee” is so well-established, member-states are reluctant to expand refugee
as a definition.124
However, this narrow definition of refugee is lacking and wrongly assumes
the definition of “refugee” laid out by the 1951 Convention “captures most
instances of refugeehood and displacement.”125 In contrast, the UNHCR, the
international governmental body at the forefront of international refugee rights
and issues, has a considerably larger breadth in their definition of refugee.126 The
large variance in the definition of refugee further emphasizes the need for a
separate category for climate change displaced persons, outside of the definition
of “refugee.” Additionally, the constraint of the Refugee Compact in defining
“refugee” suggests that there is likely to be little help found for climate change
displaced persons within the Refugee Compact.127
Second, the Refugee Compact also focuses on global responsibility-sharing
as a method of encouraging global cooperation.128 One of the Refugee
Compact’s main goals and important visions is the global sharing of
119

Id.
See McDonnell, supra note 24.
121
Id.
122
See New York Declaration, supra note 109.
123
Costello, supra note 110, at 645.
124
See Alexander Aleinikoff, The Unfinished Work of the Global Compact on Refugees, 30 INT’L. J.
REFUGEE L. 611, 615 (2018) (“[R]efugee norms are understood as binding; thus the inclusion of climate changerelated migration in the Refugee Compact threatened to impose new obligations on States in a way that their
inclusion in the Migration Compact does not.”).
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Costello, supra note 110.
126
Id.; see also Aleinikoff, supra note 124, at 614 (“Through General Assembly resolutions, regional
instruments, and international practice, the definition of ‘refugee’ – and UNHCR’s mandate to provide
international protection – has evolved.”).
127
See Stephanie Garcia, What a UN Ruling Could Mean for Climate Refugees, PBS (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/as-cop-25-ends-a-look-at-why-climate-migrants-dont-have-refugeestatus.
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See generally The Global Compact on Refugees, supra note 117.
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responsibility in coming to solutions and mitigating actions for the current
number of people migrating within and outside their countries of origin.129
However, some scholars take issue with responsibility sharing.130
Responsibility sharing on a global scale, coupled with the relative powerlessness
of refugees and those displaced internationally in international law, could lead
to the tragedy of the commons.131 Even though as a conceptual matter, the
international community recognizes that some form of global burden sharing
would advance the interests of refugees, host countries, and also receiving
countries, recently the global community has seen a trend of withdrawal of
support.132 Host States that would have previously offered resettlement
opportunities have slowly been withdrawing or tempering their resettlement
programs.133
Perhaps most crucially, “the States that now benefit from a system that
essentially locks refugees into host States have recognized that they can better
protect their own interests by doubling down on deterrence measures than by
joining a plan for responsible distribution of the world’s displaced.”134 We can
see it now in the promulgation of anti-migrant and anti-immigrant rhetoric
internationally, with countries that have historically been leaders in relocation
efforts refusing to expand and in some cases minimizing or withdrawing their
support.135 Now, there is less incentive for more states to become host States,
and thus the purported solution instead exacerbates the problem of refugees, and,
consequently, those persons who have been displaced by climate change.136
Finally, much of the progressive, groundbreaking framework of the Refugee
Compact is difficult to implement in practice on a large global scale because the
compact is not legally binding.137 As a result, countries can opt in or opt out at
129

Id.
See also Aleinikoff, supra note 124, at 612–13.
131
See id. at 612.
132
Id. at 613; see Marcia V. Espinoza et al., Global Compact for Migration: What is It and Why are
Countries Opposing It?, CONVERSATION (Dec. 7, 2018), https://theconversation.com/global-compact-formigration-what-is-it-and-why-are-countries-opposing-it-106654 (“[S]tates with a restrictive migration agenda,
such as Hungary, consider the symbolic act of approving the GCM as a sign that they are promoting migration.”).
133
Aleinikoff, supra note 124, at 612–13; see, e.g., Molly Enking, U.S. Won’t Take Climate Refugees
Displaced By Hurricane Dorian, GRIST (Sept. 13, 2019), https://grist.org/article/u-s-wont-take-climaterefugees-displaced-by-hurricane-dorian/ (noting the Trump administration decided not to extend temporary
protected status to residents displaced from the Bahamas by Hurricane Dorian).
134
Aleinikoff, supra note 124, at 612.
135
See, e.g., Rick Gladstone, U.S. Quits Migration Pact, Saying It Infringes on Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/03/world/americas/united-nations-migration-pact.html.
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Id.; see Aleinkoff, supra note 124, at 612.
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Costello, supra note 110, at 643.
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their own discretion, thereby removing some of the teeth in the comprehensive
framework, since it will not apply to those states that have opted out.138 Indeed,
there are already key international players that have chosen not to participate in
the negotiations or signing of the Refugee Compact, including the United States,
which until recently had been a leader in refugee relocation.139
B. Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration
Another international agreement that sprung from the New York Declaration
is the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (“Migration
Compact”).140 The final text of the Migration Compact was finalized on July 13,
2018.141 It “comprises of 23 objectives for better managing migration at local,
national, regional and global levels.”142 Its supporters laud it as the “first
comprehensive framework on migration the world has ever seen” and praise it
as a step toward multilateralism and global cooperation.143 The Migration
Compact lays out various actions “considered to be relevant policy instruments
and best practices.”144 Proponents of the Migration Compact call it a historic
moment, lauding the “enormous potential” of the compact.145 The former
General Assembly President, Miroslav Lac Lajčák, who presided over the initial
meeting, stated:
It does not encourage migration, nor does it aim to stop it. It is not
legally binding. It does not dictate. It will not impose. And it fully
respects the sovereignty of States . . . . It can guide us from a reactive
to a proactive mode. It can help us to draw out the benefits of
migration, and mitigate the risks. It can provide a new platform for
cooperation. And it can be a resource, in finding the right balance

138
See Andrew W. Samaan, Enforcement of International Environmental Treaties: At Analysis, 5
FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 261, 271 (2011) (“The problem of sovereignty is a large hurdle to overcome. Although
states must honor commitments in good faith, they may also unilaterally withdraw from a regime to which they
were previously parties.”).
139
Edith M. Lederer, U.N. Approves Compact to Support World’s Refugees; U.S. Objects, AP NEWS (Dec.
17, 2018), https://apnews.com/4fd4c127e8da4801b6bb3f8d5f184404; Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key Facts About
Refugees to the U.S., PEW RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/07/keyfacts-about-refugees-to-the-u-s.
140
U.N. Refugees and Migrants, Global Compact for Migration, https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/
migration-compact.
141
Id.
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Id.
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U.N. News – Migrants and Refugees, ‘Historic Moment’ for People on the Move, As U.N. Agrees
First-Ever Global Compact on Migration (July 13, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/07/1014632
(internal quotations omitted); Marcia V. Espinoza et al., supra note 132.
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Migration Compact, supra note 108.
145
U.N. News – Migrants and Refugees, supra note 143.
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between the rights of people and the sovereignty of States.146

The Migration Compact is a framework that fosters international cooperation
among all relevant actors on migration.147 It is undoubtedly an impressive work
of global cooperation regarding the world’s framework on improving the lives
of migrants in both their country of origin and their country of destination.148
One of the main objectives of the Migration Compact is to “[m]inimize the
adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country
of origin[.]”149 Crucially, though, the Migration Compact also specifically
highlights the challenges posed to people who are forced to migrate because of
climate change, utilizing the phrase “slow-onset natural disasters” and thereby
recognizing climate change as one driver of migration.150 More than that, the
Migration Compact also contemplates the possibility of a framework that might
answer this specific problem.151 Such contemplation is profound since the
Migration Compact is the first inter-governmentally negotiated agreement that
deals specifically with all the dimensions of international migration.152 These
particular actions promised by the Migration Compact are encouraging to see,
as far as a movement of the global community toward recognizing the
significance of climate change displaced persons.153
However, there are several factors that still affect the effectiveness of the
Migration Compact. In particular, despite the focus of certain sections in the
Migration Compact on climate change displaced persons, the Compact itself still
leaves a gap for climate change displaced persons to fall through.
First, the Migration Compact necessarily focuses on migration in general.154
As a result, the reference to climate change—and specifically climate change
displaced persons—is limited and generalized.155 In contrast, climate change,
146

Id.
Migration Compact, supra note 108, at para. 7.
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See also id. at para. 15 (“[The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration] promotes the
well-being of migrants and the members of communities in countries of origin, transit and destination”).
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Id. at para. 18.
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Id. at paras. 18(k), (l).
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See generally Migration Compact, supra at note 108.
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UNITED NATIONS IOM, supra note 107.
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Particularly interesting is the mention of the Platform on Disaster Displacement; as discussed later in
this Comment, the Nansen Initiative was the consultative framework upon which the Platform on Disaster
Displacement was built. See generally Platform on Disaster Displacement – Our Response, PLATFORM ON
DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, https://disasterdisplacement.org/the-platform/our-response.
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See generally Migration Compact, supra note 108.
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Id.; see McDonnell, supra note 24 (“But the language in the compacts is too vague to spur much
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particularly in its position as a driver of migration, is a complex phenomenon.156
The circumstances of persons who have been displaced by climate change,
therefore, are necessarily complex.157 Although the attempt by the Migration
Compact to ensconce climate change in a discussion of migration is admirable
and worthy of praise by the international community, it still leaves room for
more specific, targeted solutions.
Second, much of the skepticism surrounding the Migration Compact’s
effectiveness mirrors the skepticism around the Refugee Compact: the Migration
Compact is not legally binding, an issue that many commentators foresee
becoming more pressing as international anti-migrant rhetoric becomes more
and more prevalent.158 Indeed, key international players such as the United
States and Australia, are either not participating in the negotiations or explicitly
refusing to sign, citing issues of national sovereignty.159
The Migration Compact stands for a milestone in international cooperation,
with acceptance by 152 member-states and a comprehensive and detailed
framework on how to encourage safe migration and the maintenance of the
dignity of those migrating.160 However, its necessary generality leaves people
displaced by climate change still wanting for structures that could lead to
meaningful protection.

156
Climate Change and Displacement, supra note 7 (“The interplay between climate, conflict, poverty
and persecution greatly increases the complexity of refugee emergencies.”).
157
Id. An issue that further complicates the circumstance of climate change displaced persons is the fact
that climate change may incur irreversible damage to certain regions throughout the world, thus forcing those
populations to relocate permanently. See id. (“The impact of natural disasters and the more gradual effects of
climate change – such as the receding waters of Lake Chad, rising sea levels for coastal communities, longer
and harsher droughts, or the creep of desertification – can create new displaced populations and pose challenges
for existing ones.”).
158
Global Compact for Migration: What is It and Why are Countries Opposing It?, supra note 132 (noting
that states like Hungary with restrictive migration agendas “consider the symbolic act of approving the GCM as
a sign they are promoting migration.”).
159
Henry Sherrell, Australia and the Global Compact on Migration, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA (Mar.
15, 2019), https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Flag
Post/2019/March/Australia_and_the_Global_Compact_on_Migration; Joshua Keating, The Nonbinding
Migration Pact That Was Too Much for Trump, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2018), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2018/12/global-compact-on-migration-u-s-and-several-european-countries-skip-out-on-migrantpact.html. This has also prompted certain scholars to wonder if the Migration Compact might be “dead on
arrival.” Lex Rieffel, The Global Compact on Migration: Dead on Arrival?, BROOKINGS (Dec. 12, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/12/12/the-global-compact-on-migration-dead-on-arrival.
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See General Assembly Officially Adopts Roadmap for Migrants to Improve Safety, Ease Suffering, U.N.
NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/12/1028941.

YU2_4.8.21

538

4/8/2021 5:11 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

IV. REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS AS THE SOLUTION
As discussed in Section III, there seems to be little space in the definitions
of already-established international law where climate change displaced persons
might find relief. Climate change displaced persons cannot necessarily avail
themselves of protection under refugee status. International migrant laws are
general enough to encompass climate change displaced persons, but there is little
recourse allotted for migrants generally, and the current political atmosphere
surrounding migrants and migration patterns may actually hinder any sort of
help climate change displaced persons may otherwise receive.161
However, the fact that regional treaties like the OAU Convention and the
Cartagena Declaration exist, which provide more comprehensive protection to
citizens in those regions, suggests regional treaties could provide the mechanism
by which states are able to develop procedures and policies that specifically
address the unique needs of climate change displaced persons. As discussed
more fully below, regional treaties have several distinct advantages, especially
in the realm of climate change displaced persons.
A. Climate Change Displaced Persons Tend to Remain Within Their Region
Although most people who are displaced by climate change remain in their
country, the migrants who do leave their countries as a result of climate change
generally remain within their region, with the exception of Latin American
countries.162 This could be for a multitude of reasons; usually, those who are
displaced as a result of climate change or otherwise forced to move because of
sudden onset natural disasters generally tend to have fewer resources.163
Therefore, they may not have the means of leaving the region. Another reason
might be that populations whose livelihoods and homes are affected by natural
disasters (either sudden or slow-onset) may not want to move far.164 People who
have been displaced do not only have to rebuild the physical foundations of their
lives but also the social and communal foundations.165

161

See generally Global Compact for Migration: What is It and Why are Countries Opposing It?, supra

note 132.
162

Stapleton et al., supra note 6, at fig.3.
Sridharan, supra note 71 (“That’s why it’s the poorest people who are most affected. People living in
informal homes or shacks in Bangladesh or Haiti or even in Puerto Rico are among those who will be worstaffected and most likely to be compelled to move.”).
164
Id. (“There are dozens of native Alaskan communities that want to move inland, because they are
literally falling into the water as the permafrost melts beneath them. They don’t even want to move very far
inland.”).
165
Anthony Oliver-Smith, Disasters and Large-Scale Population Dislocations: International and
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Additionally, the states in the region would be in the best position with the
most pertinent knowledge on not only the issues of climate change that force
people to migrate internationally, but also on the unique societal issues that
coincide and sometimes exacerbate issues of climate change induced
displacement within the region.166 For example, the drafters of the OAU
Convention and the Cartagena Declaration both recognized urgent issues that
were affecting the citizens of the countries in Africa and Central America.167 As
a result, both the OAU Convention and the Cartagena Declaration were able to
tailor their methods to their region’s particular needs.168
In this way, a focus on climate change displaced persons can be
distinguished from a focus through the lens of the larger category of “refugee”
under the definition in the 1951 Convention, since a focus on climate change
displaced persons naturally must be narrower. Specific climate change issues
vary from region to region.169 For example, Pakistan suffers from extreme heat
waves that often decimate local farmers’ crops and livelihoods, thereby inducing
migration.170 This particular type of climate change effect, and as such the steps
taken to prevent or aid climate change displaced persons in this particular region,
may not necessarily be the same in other states.171 Vietnam, conversely, is at
higher risk for “sudden onset” events such as typhoons or flooding.172
For these reasons, it seems natural to conclude that any sort of international
agreement that focuses and puts the spotlight on the plight of climate change
displaced persons is likely to be most effective when limited to a specific
region.173 The varying types of climate and region-specific climate issues
additionally supports the idea that climate change displaced persons require a
separate international framework to best address their concerns.174 To be
effective, any proffered international solutions must be tailored specifically
toward climate change displaced persons in that specific region.
National Responses, OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATURAL HAZARD SCIENCE at 10 (2019).
166
See generally Climate Change and Displacement, supra note 7.
167
Arboleda, supra note 77, at 186, 200.
168
Id.
169
Stapleton et al., supra note 6, at 17.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
See id. at 25 (“In recognising that human mobility is a systemic issue (para. 111), [the Addis Ababa
Action Agenda] reinforces the need for national and regional planning and formal and informal support at these
levels, as well as at international level.”).
174
See Lauren Nishimura, Climate Change Migrants: Impediments to a Protection Framework and the
Need to Incorporate Migration into Climate Change Adaptation Strategies, 27 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 107, 126
(2015).
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B. Key International Players are More Likely to Enter Regional Treaties
One of the greatest issues that impeded the potential for the Global Compacts
on Refugees and Migration was the fact that many key international players
refrained from joining or even participating in the negotiation. This is a problem
that will also likely be faced by regional treaties. However, regional treaties as
a vehicle for international law may go some distance in ameliorating some of
the considerations that cause key players in the international forums to refrain
from joining treaties.
First, there are high transaction costs for open multilateral treaties—that is,
treaties like the Refugee Compact and Migration Compact that are open to the
entire international community.175 Because there are more countries, global
agreements are more difficult to get off the ground.176 This may dissuade states
from negotiating where the public good (i.e. humanitarian benefits for climate
change displaced persons) is not attractive enough.177
However, there is some literature that suggests there may also be higher
transactional costs for non-U.N. multilateral treaties (“closed” multilateral
treaties).178 Because of the specificity required in closed multilateral treaties and
the relatively fewer members to closed multilateral treaties as opposed to open,
U.N. multilateral treaties, authors of a working paper endorsed by the University
of Chicago School of Law, Miles and Posner, postulate there may be higher
transaction costs for members negotiating in closed multilateral treaties.179
In their analysis of the data collected when they compared the countries in
the world and the treaties entered by those countries, Miles and Posner
discovered larger, wealthier states are more likely to enter into closed
multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties.180 Additionally, they discovered that
the average number of non-U.N. multilateral treaties states join far outnumbers
the number of U.N. multilateral treaties joined.181 Miles and Posner also
discovered that “[s]tates tend to belong to more closed multilateral treaties than
175
Thomas J. Miles & Eric A. Posner, Which States Enter Into Treaties, and Why? 7 (Univ. of Chi. L.
Sch. Pub. L. & L. Theory, Working Paper No. 225, 2008); Todd Sandler, Environmental Cooperation:
Contrasting International Environmental Agreements, 69 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 345, 360 (2017).
176
Miles & Posner, supra note 175, at 7; Sandler, supra note 175, at 360 (“By involving all countries,
global agreements are more difficult to consummate unless there are relatively few necessary participants, who
view benefits and costs in a similar fashion[.]”).
177
Miles & Posner, supra note 175, at 4–6.
178
Id. at 6.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 10–11.
181
Id.
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open multilateral treaties, but each closed multilateral treaty has on average
fewer members than open multilateral treaties do.”182
Although Miles and Posner only observe the data and do not draw further
conclusions, the data do suggest that most countries prefer to enter into closed
multilateral treaties over open multilateral ones. Conversely, what the data at the
very least imply are that countries are more likely to be parties to closed, nonU.N. multilateral treaties over open, U.N. multilateral treaties. Additionally,
where countries in the same region know each other’s preferences and biases,
transaction costs among those countries are reduced.183
Thus, a regional multilateral agreement may be able to close the gap on the
problem posed by the global compacts while simultaneously being more specific
and appropriate for the regional problems.
C. The Impact of Regional Agreements on International Law
In addition to its theoretical benefits as discussed in the previous subsection,
regional agreements can have far-reaching effects in the realm of general
international law. The Nansen Initiative is especially illustrative of the power
and impact of successful regional agreements, particularly in the developing
realm of climate change induced displacement.
The Nansen Initiative was co-launched by the Norwegian and Swiss
governments in October 2012 after the UNHCR held a Ministerial meeting to
commemorate the 60th anniversary of the Refugee Convention.184 Norway and
Switzerland were the pioneering countries, joined by Costa Rica, Germany, and
Mexico.185 The Nansen Initiative aimed to “build a consensus on key principles
and elements regarding the protection of persons displaced across borders in the
context of natural disasters that sets the agenda for future action at domestic,
regional, and international levels.”186 It did this with an emphasis on state action
and a bottom-up approach to the issue of climate changed persons.187
182

Id.
Sandler, supra note 175, at 360.
184
Jane McAdam, Creating New Norms? The Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border
Displacement, BROOKINGS (Apr. 1, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/creating-new-norms-the-nanseninitiative-on-disaster-induced-cross-border-displacement/ [hereinafter Creating New Norms? The Nansen
Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Displacement].
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.; Jane McAdam, From the Nansen Initiative to the Platform on Disaster Displacement: Shaping
International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, 39(4) UNSW L.J. 1518, 1521 (2016)
[hereinafter Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement] (“There was a
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In 2012, the Nansen Initiative recognized the gap left by trying to fit climate
change displaced persons into the definition of “refugee” under the 1951
Convention.188 In trying to close these gaps, the Nansen Initiative focused on
state-led “disaster preparedness [] to prevent [] forced displacement and ensure
better protection for those affected.”189 Such measures later informed a
Protection Agenda that was added into the Platform on Disaster
Displacement.190 In October 2015, the Protection Agenda was adopted by 109
states in Geneva.191
There are several areas in which the Nansen Initiative succeeded and where
future regional agreements that focus on climate change can emulate. These
successes can be grouped into two different realms. The first realm is the macro,
large-scale, big-picture realm: the Nansen Initiative succeeded in bringing to an
international audience the specific problem of cross-border migration as a result
of climate change and other natural disasters.192 Although recognition is
certainly not sufficient for immediate results and change, it signals to the global
community that states should be contemplating the next move regarding climate
change displaced persons.
Additionally, in the case of the Nansen Initiative, the information and
resources shared and gathered as a part of the Nansen Initiative contributed to
the development of international law on an international scale.193 As Jane
McAdam, Director of the Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law at the
University of New South Wales, writes:
In turn, the Nansen Initiative could leverage existing processes by
‘framing and feeding’ its findings into related policy initiatives, thus
building up a common language on and coordinated approach to
disaster- and climate change-related mobility. It also became a focal
point for researchers and organisations working in the area – a hub that
connected scholars, policymakers, practitioners and officials – and
organically became a depository and ‘go to’ point for up-to-date
information. It was highly successful both in mobilising the relevant

strong sense that if any work was to be done on the topic, it should be led by states rather than an international
organisation.”).
188
Platform on Disaster Displacement, FED. DEPT. FOREIGN AFFS., https://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/
home/foreign-policy/human-rights/humanitarian-policy/nansen-initiative.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2019).
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, supra note 187.
193
Platform on Disaster Displacement, supra note 188.
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actors and creating multi-sectoral networks, and in collating resources
and knowledge.194

This particular strength of the Nansen Initiative—that is, “building up a common
language on and coordinated approach to disaster- and climate change-related
mobility[]”—is precisely the foundation for any regional agreement that aims to
provide a framework for climate change displaced persons.195
The second realm where the Nansen Initiative succeeds is on more of a
micro-level. It provides a framework by which states can consult with each other
on best practices to address the needs of people displaced internationally as a
result of natural disasters and climate change without jeopardizing national
sovereignty and agency.196
Most importantly, though, the Nansen Initiative brought the issue back to the
local, regional, and national levels, rather than keeping it stuck in the quagmire
of international policymaking.197 It emphasized the value in letting states
collaborate and work together with other states in the region, thereby creating a
common language.198 Various regional consultations occurred to “feed” the
Nansen Initiative process in the Pacific, Central America, Horn of Africa,
Southeast Asia, and South Asia.199 Participants from those various regions
helmed these regional consultations, meeting to discuss concerns over crossborder relocation.200
Much of the strength of the Nansen Initiative lay in the establishment of
state-led consultative processes that were just as much about international
cooperation as allowing states in the region to helm and participate in that
international effort. Deep delves into research helmed by and provided for
regional states can certainly help inform and provide structure for the regional
agreements that can be made to address the legal blind spot for climate change
displaced persons.

194

Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters and Displacement, supra note 187, at

1525.
195
196
197
198
199
200

Id.
NANSEN INITIATIVE, https://www.nanseninitiative.org/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2019).
Shaping International Approaches to Climate Change, supra note 187, at 1524.
Id. at 1525.
See, e.g., NANSEN INITIATIVE, supra note 196.
Id.
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V. WHAT MIGHT A REGIONAL TREATY LOOK LIKE?
The question of what exactly a regional treaty might say to address the
problem of climate change displaced persons exceeds the scope of this
Comment. However, this Comment will endeavor to posit some suggestions
from existing international precedent and initiatives that may inform how
regional actors may decide to approach the issue of climate change displaced
persons.
It is crucial that whatever the regional treaty contains in the way of language
or policy should avoid assigning affirmative obligations to the member states
party to it. With anti-migrant rhetoric sweeping throughout countries
internationally, the danger of assigning any affirmative obligation in the treaty
is that, international players will balk at the idea of signing and participating as
a result of internal pressures.201 For example, the United States has backed out
of the Refugee and Migrant Compacts.202 Domestic politics remains a thorny
tangle and the greatest barrier for any kind of substantial change on an
international level.
Therefore, regional agreements specifically targeted at climate change
displaced persons may be more acceptable to key international players if they
go the way of the Nansen Initiative. Rather than requiring affirmative
obligations—particularly in the realm of immigration law, which can infringe
upon national sovereignty—the regional agreements would be more palatable if
they were focused on collating resources and sharing information with a specific
eye on climate change displaced persons.203 Particularly compelling might be
information targeted at how policies can be developed within the countries
themselves to better improve the existing infrastructure in place to assist those
who have been displaced by climate change related phenomena.
These internal development strategies have already begun to take form
through efforts of the World Bank.204 Take, for example, the story of Monoara
Khatun, a 23-year-old seamstress from Bangladesh.205 As a result of repeated
flooding in her village and the resultant increase in unemployment, she had to
201
See generally Rick Gladstone, U.S. Quits Migration Pact, Saying It Infringes on Sovereignty, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/03/world/americas/united-nations-migration-pact.
html.
202
Id.
203
NANSEN INITIATIVE, supra note 196.
204
See generally Meet the Human Faces of Climate Migration, WORLD BANK (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/03/19/meet-the-human-faces-of-climate-migration.
205
Id.
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move to the capital city of Bangladesh, Dhaka.206 This is not an uncommon
experience; in fact, Bangladesh has been highlighted by the World Bank as one
of three countries that are projected to have a substantial increase in people who
have been displaced by climate change.207 Since most people who have been
displaced tend to remain in their country, they tend to move from rural areas to
more urban areas; such urban areas may not have the infrastructure in place to
handle the sudden influx of new residents.208
However, in Monoara’s case, she was able to avail herself of one of the
World Bank’s initiatives, the NARI project.209 The NARI project provides
training, transitional housing, counseling, and job placement services for poor
and vulnerable women.210 By connecting with it, Monoara was able to support
her family members who still remain in the village and gain financial
independence for herself.211 Monoara’s case exemplifies how integral
development plans can be in helping countries handle the inevitable occurrence
of migration.212 Any regional agreement should acknowledge the development
of such initiatives for climate change displaced persons. Additionally, the added
benefit of focusing regional agreements on development and policy planning is
that such regional agreements would likely be more agreeable to countries who
are more reluctant to fully engage in the ever-increasing issue of climate change
displaced persons.
CONCLUSION
There is still a lot of work to be done for the case of climate change displaced
persons, globally, regionally, and domestically. Certainly, pre-existing global
international frameworks have been found lacking for those who must cross
borders to escape the rising flood or the increasing drought, since international
treaties do not address the gap left by the definition of refugees because these
international treaties do not specifically target climate change displaced
persons.213
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However, international law cannot afford to be so reluctant to envelop
climate change displaced persons, even if it must begin with non-binding
regional agreements. With the increasing certainty that climate change is altering
the world, the lack of attention and solutions for climate change displaced
persons is an unacceptable reality.
This Comment has suggested that establishing regional frameworks better
takes into consideration the distinctive problems and unique political and legal
systems in each region, given the potential host countries in the region will likely
largely receive climate change displaced persons in that region.214
First, regional agreements are more sensitive to the variations in region,
whereas global compacts tend to paint with a broader brush.215 Regional
agreements are able to take into consideration the unique positions many key
players in that region have regarding the ability to host climate change displaced
persons who are at risk of losing their homes to climate change related
disasters.216 This could have the additional benefit of incentivizing or at least
lowering the transaction cost of negotiating an agreement in the region.217
Regional agreements would allow less of a diffusion of responsibility-sharing
that may lead to a tragedy of the commons situation, as some scholars have
suggested is a fault of the Refugee Compact.218
Second, regional multilateral agreements can “constitute an important step
in the process of putting such displacement onto the international agenda.”219 By
placing climate change displaced persons on the international agenda,
multilateral regional agreements may lay important groundwork for more
effective, more binding treaties in the future.
What might a regional treaty or agreement regarding solutions for persons
displaced by climate change look like? That solution can be modeled after the
pre-existing framework of the Nansen Initiative, which has a history of success
in the mobilizing countries that volunteered to take part and “collating resources
and knowledge” among multi-sectoral networks.220 As stated above, the Nansen
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Initiative was not a treaty.221 Rather, it was a consultative process whose mission
was to utilize soft law to build global consensus, which it hoped would include
standards of treatment.222
Alternatively, states can take initiatives to convene to discuss this quicklydeveloping issue, as countries in Central America and Africa did.223 However,
this may require a concerted effort on the part of domestic actors in states to
recognize climate change displacement as a real issue and concern.224 The OAU
Convention and the Cartagena Declaration were both responses to widelyacknowledged problems in the region.225 Thus, those states were prompted to
create solutions.226
In comparison, climate change has not yet been identified in certain
countries as a problem.227 For example, the United States, despite once being a
leader in humanitarian assistance, has since stopped funding climate change
adaption and, in conjunction, heightened the parameters of its immigration
criteria.228 This reluctance to acknowledge climate change even as a problem,
let alone a driver of international migration, likely means that these countries
will not participate in regional solutions regarding persons who have been
displaced internationally by climate change.229
Additionally, some of the issues that plagued the Refugee and Migrant
Compacts still apply to regional treaties or agreements. The Nansen Initiative
was a voluntary agreement.230 Whatever regional agreements that come out of
negotiations within the region will likely be the same, since there was such an
intense backlash regarding the Refugee and Migration Compacts from countries
that would best be able to host any climate change displaced persons.231 Key
221
About Us, supra note 59 (“The Nansen Initiative does not seek to develop new legal standards, but
rather to build consensus among states on the elements of a protection agenda, which may include standards of
treatment.”).
222
Id.
223
Arboleda, supra note 77.
224
See Oona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
588, 613 (2007).
225
Arboleda, supra note 77, at 187.
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See, e.g., Sridharan, supra note 71.
228
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See also Maria C. Garcia, Does the United States Need a Climate Refugee Policy?, HISTORICAL
CLIMATOLOGY—BLOG (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.historicalclimatology.com/blog/does-the-united-statesneed-a-climate-refugee-policy.
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international players, like the United States, may still refuse to enter
international treaties as a result of concerns of national security and immigration
policy grounds.232
In response, this Comment has suggested two potential avenues by which
regional treaties can attempt to circumvent the pitfalls of existing international
agreements. First, regional treaties can emulate the Nansen Initiative by only
creating guidelines for information-sharing among the states in the region.
Second, regional treaties may attempt to structure around initiatives like the
World Bank that can create programs for domestic use within that region to
better prepare cities to handle the inevitable migration of climate change
displaced persons.
Regardless of the contemplated solutions, it is becoming increasingly clear
the international community can no longer wait to act. With sea levels rising and
threatening the Pacific island nations, with climate change exacerbating drought
and desertification, with Australia on fire, the issue of climate change displaced
persons should be at the forefront of domestic policymakers’ minds.233 Society’s
collective feet are being held to the proverbial fire; if we do not take up the
mantle, we may very well end up getting burned.
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